REALMS OF ANARCHY
KENNETH WALTZ’S VISION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
di Augusto Tamponi

Kenneth Neal Waltz was an eminent American political scientist who was born on June 8, 1924, in Ann Arbor, Michigan. He was regarded one of the most prominent academics in the subject of International Relations. Waltz was an original founder of neorealism in international relations theory: this theoretical approach emphasizes the role of power politics in international relations, sees competition and conflict as enduring characteristics, and is pessimistic about existence of real possibilities for cooperation.

According to Waltz, the best way to understand international politics is to look at the structure of the international system as represented in alliances and other forms of cooperation between nations. In that it defines politics as the competitive interplay of self-interested agents, Waltz’s neorealist method is part of political theory’s realist heritage. It does, however, stray from traditional realism.

The anarchic condition of international relations and the allocation of power among nations are the two key characteristics of Waltz’s thesis. The absence of a higher authority to adjudicate international issues is referred to as anarchy. Simply said, there is no world government, hence international politics is anarchic. Second, international politics is defined by an unequal distribution of power and the ability of the world’s most powerful governments to create a world order that serves their interests.

Waltz has always paid close attention to the international system’s “polar” character. He has long been a critic of the unipolar system that emerged following the fall of the Soviet Union, because it allowed one superpower (the United States) to engage in overseas adventures.

This work has the purpose to write an analysis of one of Waltz’s most important books,”Man, the State and War” (1959), a work that is now a pillar in the study of the field of International relations.

From the very first pages of the book, the author makes his intention clear: that is to explain in a practical way the causes that concretely lead to the outbreak of armed conflicts as a resolution of disputes between states, thus setting the goal of providing answers that can serve as a basis for building an international system that can effectively prevent wars: knowing the causes of war is (and must be) preparatory to achieving peace (p. 2).

The first aspect that stands out to the eye is precisely the proactive approach that Waltz adopts, namely that of explaining the causes of conflicts in such a way as to obtain the right tools to prevent them; he therefore does not mince words about his intention to focus his Man, the State, and War on the need to “identifying and achieving the conditions of peace, a problem that plagues men and bedevils the student of international relations, has [...] bedeviled philosophers as well” (p. 12).

The book had a huge impact in the discipline of international relations thanks above all to the development of the three “images of analysis” that Waltz uses to explain the conflicts within international politics: we are talking about the individual, the state and, finally, of the international system. the Author refers to these levels of analysis as “images”, and highlights the main ideas of each image with the help of the writings of some important political philosophers of the past.

The first level of analysis (therefore the first image) is the individual one: man, as an individual guided by certain common impulses in human nature, is among the first factors to make up the use of conflict. Indicating aggression, selfishness and stupidity as intrinsic characteristics in human nature that favor the outbreak of wars, Waltz therefore states that these find, among their causes, “the character and manners of men” (p. 16), also explaining how, in his opinion, it is possible at least to limit these character settings through education (p. 17).

We need to dwell now on a misunderstanding that has long prevailed between the interpretations of Man, the State, and War. The reference to “human nature” may lead one to think at first that Waltz is referring in a simplistic way to the nature of some particularly charismatic heads of state and with craving for power and expansion who, due to their attitude, drag their own countries within bloody conflicts. Although history does not lack examples of leaders with these characteristics (just think of the terrible dictatorships of the twentieth century) the reconstruction would be all too simple: in fact Waltz seems to refer to human nature in general, which certainly is not alien to certain leaders or heads of state, but they are certainly not the ones who create from nothing.

Waltz considers the contributions of the behavioral sciences, noting that “The more fully behavioral scientists take account of politics, the more sensible and the more modest their efforts to contribute to peace become”(page 79).Aggression, selfishness, distrust of others and so on are characteristics common to man as such, intrinsic attitudes. The author thus seems to make his own the reconstruction of Hobbes for which homo homini lupus: human nature, being tending to the oppression of others, tends to conflict, which is in fact mitigated only by the stipulation of the social contract that leads, finally, in the state.

The discussion then continues with the investigation of the second level of analysis, consisting of the second of the three images, namely that of the State. It is interesting to note how, while in the first image philosophical speculation about the effects of the various inclinations of human nature prevailed in some way, in this second level of analysis, the author veers decisively towards an approach more specifically based on analysis. politics: the discussion seems at this point to take on more “technical” guises, in which the author’s political background is decidedly more marked.

In this case, Waltz intends to analyze the internal structure of states in order to bring back part of the phenomenology of their foreign policy, explicitly stating that “the internal organization of states is the key to understanding war and peace” (p. 81 ). Waltz somehow attributes the absence of peace to the shortcomings of internal state structures. In doing so, he cites for example some liberal theorists of the nineteenth century; they somehow, despite advocating the creation of more liberal states, leave open the question on how to behave towards those states which, by deciding to remain anchored to an internal organization of an illiberal type, could therefore remain promoters of conflicts and cause of international instability. In general, Waltz illustrates the idea that states have often need an external enemy to unify their populations, resulting in a clear criticism of Waltz in the confrontation i of the nationalistic exasperations of which the twentieth century, particularly in its first half, tragically witnessed (pp. 81-82).

In this case, it is very interesting to note that the author is not referring only to particular ideologies, although certainly, as observed, these often play a crucial role in raising international tension: in fact, Waltz also specifically refers to the theory of Lenin’s imperialism, according to which the main cause of the war is to be found in the physiological need that the states based on the capitalist system have to continually open new markets (and to conquer them) in order to be able to continue to guarantee the needs of their economic system. Waltz speaks explicitly of how the divergence of interests and, in particular, the circumstance in which each state perceives its interests differently from how they are perceived by other states, thus creating a detachment that favors the outbreak of armed conflicts (p. 83).

The author then offers a reflection on the irrationality of those states that wage war, despite the economic instability that almost always derives from it also directly compromises them. Therefore, to explain an irrational behavior, which Waltz defines to be War, the conclusion comes to the aid of economic stability, states would seem to put the need to consolidate their internal power (pp. 99-100) first.

This thesis certainly finds the support of the phenomenology of many tyrannies of which history has been the theater, but it also seems to fall into the simplification according to which all wars would be irrational as a factor of economic instability. In this case, there are many questions left unanswered by the author: how could this paradigm hold true, for example, for those cases in which war is waged by a state that is forced to resort to this solution in order to react to hostile actions by another state that could compromise its economic stability?

Furthermore, this interpretation of Waltz seems to work less and less in a world in which the economy is a weapon that, within international relations, takes the place of the sword and the bomb.

The third and final level of analysis is the one that introduces the image of the international system. The author introduces the concept of “international anarchy” here. Readers must be careful not to confuse this concept with that of anarchy in its best-known ideological meaning. Waltz, in fact, refers precisely to the absence of a governmental structure of the system of states. In the international system, every state is sovereign, and every state structure exists without a superordinate power that is able to exert a truly autonomous and super partes coercive force that frees individual states from the burden of having to act individually to protect their security.

It is interesting to note that, not surprisingly, the chapter in question begins with a quotation from Cicero “For what can be done against force without force” (page 159); the focal point of the problem identified by Waltz lies in the fact that in the absence of a superordinate structure that ensures compliance with the rules of coexistence within the international community while harmonizing the system, each state will have its own individual interests which, of course, could from time to time find themselves in conflict with those of other states, thus causing the wars.

Each state therefore has the possibility of using force, without there being a superior entity that can prevent it or that can effectively sanction it in the event of a violation of the impediment. And, in a system in which practically everyone has the possibility to use force (albeit with the differences due to the geopolitical proportions of each state), international tension will always remain high because each state will perceive the possibility of being attacked or, in any case, of having to deal with the eventuality of another state resorting to force.

Waltz appears here very lucid in observing, in fact, how a system governed by tension does nothing but encourage the emergence of further tensions; it seems possible to observe, in this case, Waltz’s distrust of deterrence devices (it is impossible not to think of the atomic one). However, rather than a general distrust of deterrence, the author seems oriented towards the hope that this deterrence will be removed from the hands of individual states and given to a supranational structure not involved in the national interests of individual states.

An interesting passage is the one in which Waltz compares the states in the current world to individuals who are in the natural state (p. 163), that is the hypothetical condition in which men are not yet associated with each other and therefore governed by an apparatus government and related regulations, as is the case in the rule of law.

The concept of the natural state has been treated by various thinkers with often diametrically opposed judgments, and it is clear that Waltz refers more to the negative evaluation given by Hobbes, who defined the Natural State as the war of each man against all others (Vellum omnium contra omnes), rather than that of Rousseau, who instead considered this condition in a positive way, believing that, in it, men live “free, healthy, happy and good”. Waltz, however, does not hesitate to embrace the thesis of the French philosopher according to which the only way to achieve peace between states is to establish an international government that obliges them with the same force as the law that exists within state systems, keeping but also present the vision of Immanuel Kant who agreed on the need for a supranational government, but insisted more explicitly on the need to establish this type of federation on a voluntary basis (p. 185).

Here, therefore, the question of why states should autonomously choose a path that limits their sovereignty and their interests, on the basis of what was previously observed, seems to remain unresolved, renouncing those irrational behaviors treated in the second image, which put the protection of own interests and, in particular, of the internal order, international stability and its positive implications. At this point the question arises how to arrive at this type of solution: would it be possible to force states to federate? Would it be right to do it? In the absence of a constraint to recognize themselves in a supranational government, what would be the arguments that should push subjects that the author himself defines as “irrational” to converge for a solution that Waltz himself considers to be just and rational? In this part of the discussion it is therefore impossible not to notice some contradictions.

The author then returns to the visionpessimistic of a world dominated by tension, observing that “According to the third image, there is a constant possibility of war in a world in which there are two or more states each seeking to promote a set of interests and having no agency upon which they can rely for protection. “ (p. 227)

Despite the fact that Waltz feels all three representations are important, he emphasizes that the third vision of anarchical state organization places the most emphasis on state activity, war, and peace. The final picture, according to Waltz, depicts the global political structure. He goes on to say that without the first and second pictures, there can be no understanding of the factors that shape policy, thus they’re all important.

 
In particular, Waltz defines the first two levels of analysis (the Individual and the State) as the efficient causes of war, since the attitudes of the individual in the first image, and the actions of states on the international scene in the second, are comparable to an engine capable of driving conflicts. The third level, however, constitutes in all respects the permissive cause of war, since it is the anarchic nature of the international system that actually allows wars to break out.

The particular attention that Waltz therefore pays to the anarchy that governs the rational system is evident in the fact that if it is difficult for the nature of individuals, and in the absence of a supranational system, states will always be led west to the war solution, the most easily reachable is to strengthen the authority and, above all, the autonomy of supranational institutions in such a way as to strengthen more and more a framework that from generic governance becomes effective government, capable of balancing the demands of individual states and of preventing effective use of war as a tool for resolving international disputes.