N° 59 - NOVEMBRE 2012
(XC)
Assessing the construction of Japan-China diplomatic dialogue
political relations during the Cold War
by Oliviero Frattolillo
During
the
1950s,
Tokyo
and
Peking
were
separated
politically
and
economically
because
of
structural
limitations
imposed
by
the
bipolar
system
(Hook,
Gilson,
Hughes,
Dobson
2001,
164).
In
those
years,
the
positions
of
both
the
countries
in
the
international
system
were
well
defined:
Japan
was
a
U.S.
ally,
totally
dependent
on
the
latter’s
foreign
strategies;
China
was
a
trustworthy
friend
of
the
USSR.
In
attempting
to
understand
Japan-China
relations
within
the
Cold
War
context,
one
may
start
with
a
reinterpretation
-
from
an
international
perspective
-
of
the
history
of
relations
between
the
two
countries,
as
it
has
been
investigated
so
far.
It
is
clear
that
the
orientation
towards
the
“Separation
of
Politics
and
Economics”
(seikei
bunri),
inaugurated
by
Yoshida
Shigeru
(1948-1954)
and
continued
by
Ikeda’s
administration,
is
not
simply
the
result
of
the
constraints
imposed
by
the
bipolar
system.
Japan,
embedded
within
the
Western
bloc,
could
never
maintain
official
relations
with
a
Communist
country
and
old
friend
of
the
Kremlin.
It
is
important
to
remember
that
a
long
trip
undertaken
by
Yoshida
in
1954
brought
him
to
Europe
earlier
than
the
U.S.
Few
years
later,
and
after
two
new
cabinets,
during
Kishi
Nobusuke’s
term
(1957-1960),
international
trade
problems
inevitably
became
intertwined
with
political
and
strategic
issues.
Kishi
was
the
best
figure
the
Americans
could
hope
for
to
lead
the
Japanese
government.
The
new
Premier’s
economic
vision,
his
hatred
for
the
Soviets
and
(unlike
Yoshida
and
Hatoyama)
his
fear
of
getting
too
close
to
the
Chinese
-
not
to
mention
his
love
for
golf
-
made
him
most
welcome
in
Washington
to
Eisenhower
(LaFeber
1997).
He
was
convinced
that
the
rapprochement
with
Peking
was
not
a
priority
issue
in
Japan’s
foreign
politics,
which
he
felt
should
focus
on
(non
Communist)
Southeast
Asia
and
commit
to
making
its
economy
more
competitive
(Takahashi
2000,
178-179).
In
the
late
1950s,
therefore,
a
new
international
economic
era
began,
characterized
by
the
rapid
growth
of
the
Japanese
and
European
poles.
This
phenomenon
took
shape
in
conjunction
with
the
process
of
decolonization
and
revealed
the
emergence
of
a
slow
structural
change
in
the
previous
political-economic
dynamics.
The
American
containment
strategy
of
the
1950s
greatly
weighed
on
the
evolution
of
Japan-China
relations;
the
small
attempts
at
rapprochement
between
China
and
Japan
during
the
1950s
and
1960s
were
designed
to
circumvent
the
restrictions
imposed
by
the
bipolar
system
by
trying
to
encourage
gradual,
minor
contact
between
the
two
countries.
But
unlike
the
strong
and
solid
alliances
between
European
countries
and
the
two
superpowers,
the
covenants
of
the
Asian
countries
with
the
two
blocs
were
more
volatile.
One
of
the
countries
that
can
demonstrate
how
the
application
of
bipolarism
changed
in
some
respects
in
the
Far
East
is
China,
which
went
from
being
an
ally
of
the
USSR
(then
fully
inside
the
Communist
bloc)
to
its
antagonist.
One
can
say
that
during
the
1960s,
China
isolated
itself
by
challenging
both
of
the
superpowers
and
almost
creating
a
“third
bloc.”
In
this
regard,
it
must
be
pointed
out
that
the
Soviets
never
hid
their
suspicion
that
Peking’s
real
intentions
were
to
induce
a
confrontation
between
Moscow
and
Washington,
with
the
emergence
of
China
as
the
only
power
that
could
benefit
from
it.
China’s
changing
role
during
the
Cold
War
should
be
connected
primarily
to
the
deterioration
of
China-USSR
relations.
The
1962
Cuban
crisis
revealed
that
Peking
and
Moscow
were
already
ideologically
distant
from
one
another.
Unlike
China,
Japan
maintained
a
clear
position
within
the
Western
bloc.
From
the
end
of
WWII,
it
was
able
to
benefit
from
enormous
military,
security,
and
economic
advantages
provided
by
the
U.S.
The
security
issues
were
used
by
Yoshida
as a
means
to
“pursue
the
economic
recovery
of
Japan
and
maintain
political
stability.”
The
gradual
disengagement
of
U.S.
in
Asia,
following
the
defeat
in
Vietnam
–
that
is
an
expression
of a
global
trend
towards
multipolarity
-
and
the
emergence
of
three
Communist
states
in
Indochina
concurred
during
the
launch
of
Japan’s
‘new
course
policy’
in
Southeast
Asia
(Hellmann
1972,
142).
Japan’s
official
renunciation
of
military
ambitions
showed
the
will
to
contribute
to
the
development
of
peace
and
prosperity
in
the
region,
as
well
as
its
determination
not
only
to
be
engaged
on
an
economic
and
political-diplomatic
level,
but
also
to
build
good
relationships
in
social
and
cultural
fields.
The
first
ASEAN
Summit,
held
in
Bali
on
23
and
24
February
1976,
had
indicated
that
it
was
no
longer
possible
to
postpone
a
new
policy
for
Southeast
Asia.
Fukuda’s
state
visits
that
took
place
in
August
1977
in
five
ASEAN
countries
plus
Burma
demonstrated
Japan’s
reorientation
(Iokibe
2010,
178).
For
some
of
those
states
it
was
the
first
official
visit
made
by a
Japanese
prime
minister
in
the
post-war
years,
the
last
official
occasion
of
meeting
at
the
intergovernmental
level
dating
back
to
5
and
6
November
1943,
in
the
notorious
political
context
of
the
Dai
tō-A
kaigi,
or “Greater
East
Asia
Conference”
(also
known
as
the
“Tokyo
Conference”).
Fukuda’s
ASEAN
diplomacy
marked
a
clear
shift
in
Japan’s
Southeast
Asia
policy:
“After
his
visit
to
the
ASEAN
countries
in
1977,
the
word
‘ASEAN’
replaces
‘Southeast
Asia’
in
Japanese
political
parlance,
and
China
and
ASEAN
emerged
as
two
major
regional
units
in
Japan’s
Asia
policy”
(Takashi
1997,
185-186).
Initially
founded
on
the
mere
primacy
of
the
economy
and,
subsequently,
on a
combination
of
economics
and
politics,
it
marked
the
high
point
of
the
Japanese
political
and
diplomatic
strategy.
It
was
by
means
of
this
strategy
that
Japan
was
aiming
to
become
the
central
focus
of a
large
area
of
economic
development
and
political
stability
in
Asia.
At
the
same
time,
the
Japan-China
rapprochement
and
the
normalization
of
U.S.-China
diplomatic
relations
announced
in
December
of
that
year
formed
the
cornerstone
of a
policy
aimed
at
laying
the
foundations
of
Japan’s
redemption
in
political
terms
and
resolving
the
crucial
security
dilemma.
In
terms
of
security,
this
was
the
basis
of
the
emerging
geopolitical
triangulation
of
Asia
Pacific,
which
included
Japan,
China
and
the
U.S.
(Vogel,
Ming,
Tanaka
2002).
Irreversibly,
“their
security
would
now
hinge
on
the
stability
of
that
[triadic]
structure”
(Iriye
1996,
50).
No
longer
potential
enemies,
Japan
and
China
became
part
of a
new
regional
structure
designed
to
last
until
the
end
of
the
bipolar
era.
In
conclusion,
the
stages
that
have
marked
the
development
of
Japan-China
relations
were
deeply
influenced
by
intervening
variables
that
shaped
their
historical
path.
It
finally
appears
clear,
within
the
broader
context
of
the
Cold
War,
the
manner
in
which
the
beiatsu
and
the
structure
of
the
international
system
have
affected
the
evolution
of
their
diplomatic
relations.
