N. 41 - Maggio 2011
(LXXII)
A self-policing society?
The Gestapo and the role of denunciations in the Third Reich
by Marco Siddi
According
to
numerous
eyewitness
accounts
and
to
the
work
of
many
scholars,
the
Nazi
secret
police
(Geheime
Staatspolizei,
or
Gestapo)
efficiently
controlled
German
society
in
the
Third
Reich.
However,
more
recent
studies
have
suggested
that
the
local
offices
of
the
Gestapo
were
severely
understaffed
and
did
not
have
the
human
resources
to
keep
the
whole
society
under
surveillance.
Klaus-Michael
Mallmann
and
Gerhard
Paul
have
argued
that
the
popular
image
of
the
Gestapo
as
an
omniscient,
omnipotent
and
omnipresent
police
force
is a
myth
created
by
Nazi
propaganda
and
perpetuated
by
numerous
post-war
scholars,
which
also
served
as a
post-war
alibi
for
millions
of
Germans
who
had
not
opposed
the
regime.
The
skeptics
of
Gestapo’s
omnipotence
argue
that
its
successful
control
of
German
society
and
the
lack
of
active
mass
opposition
against
the
regime
can
be
explained
by
the
consensus
achieved
by
the
Nazi
state
among
the
masses
and
the
cooperation
of
large
sections
of
the
population
with
the
secret
police.
Such
cooperation
manifested
itself
primarily
in
the
form
of
voluntary
denunciations
against
alleged
enemies
of
the
Volksgemeinschaft
(the
‘national
community’,
in
Nazi
terminology).
The
emphasis
placed
by
Robert
Gellately,
Mallmann
and
Paul
on
the
importance
of
voluntary
denunciations
in
the
Third
Reich
suggests
that
Nazi
Germany
was
a
‘self-policing’
society,
namely
a
society
where
the
smooth
functioning
of
the
police
was
guaranteed
by
its
close
collaboration
with
the
civilian
population,
in
particular
thanks
to
the
latter’s
willingness
to
gather
information
for
police
activities.
However,
this
analysis
overestimates
the
importance
of
denunciations
in
initiating
Gestapo
activities.
It
oversimplifies
the
complex
scenario
of
policing
in
the
Third
Reich
and
the
role
played
in
it
by
the
civilian
population.
For
this
reason,
a
further
investigation
of
the
relationship
between
denunciations
made
by
ordinary
Germans
and
police
activities
in
the
Third
Reich
is
required.
The
Gestapo
received
numerous
denunciations
from
ordinary
Germans.
Before
assessing
the
role
of
these
denunciations
in
initiating
Gestapo
activities,
it
is
essential
to
analyze
the
social
background
of
the
denouncers
and
determine
whom
they
denounced
and
why.
Denunciations
were
made
by
members
of
all
social
classes.
However,
the
largest
number
of
them
was
made
by
lower-middle
class
or
middle
class
Germans.
The
statistical
evidence
collected
by
Eric
Johnson
concerning
the
Gestapo
offices
in
Cologne
and
Krefeld
reveals
that
denouncers
were
usually
middle-aged
males.
Mallmann
and
Paul
have
argued
that
denouncers
were
often
broken
figures
who
had
lost
faith
in
the
possibility
of
opposing
the
regime
and
had
put
themselves
at
the
Gestapo’s
disposa.
They
usually
denounced
acquaintances,
neighbours,
co-workers
and
Jews.
The
denunciations
were
motivated
almost
always
by
selfish
and
petty
reasons,
such
as
hatred,
lust
of
revenge,
personal
profit
and
receiving
the
sympathy
of
the
authorities.
As
Johnson
has
claimed,
the
nature
of
the
denunciations
implies
that
they
could
be
useful
to
the
secret
police
only
for
trivial
cases
concerning
ordinary
Germans.
The
Gestapo
could
not
rely
on
denunciations
for
the
cases
which
constituted
its
major
concern,
namely
the
networks
of
Communist,
Socialist
and
clerical
resistance.
The
evidence
collected
by
Johnson
shows
that
the
Gestapo
operations
against
Communists,
Socialists,
religious
sects
and
the
clergy
were
initiated
primarily
by
its
own
surveillance
network
and
by
confessions
during
interrogations,
not
by
denunciations
of
ordinary
Germans.
Mallmann
and
Paul
agree
with
Johnson
in
this
respect,
but
they
also
argue
that
the
number
of
paid
informers
employed
in
the
surveillance
of
political
opposition
was
very
limited
and,
consequently,
the
Gestapo
never
uncovered
large
networks
of
political
opposition.
However,
this
argument
leaves
an
essential
question
unanswered:
why
was
the
regime
never
seriously
challenged
by
the
underground
political
opposition,
if
the
Gestapo
did
not
manage
to
uncover
it
either
through
denunciations
or
through
the
activity
of
paid
informers?
There
are
two
possible
answers
to
this
question.
Firstly,
the
assertion
that
the
Gestapo
was
inefficient
and
lacked
sufficient
and
reliable
sources
of
information
can
be
questioned.
Mallmann
and
Paul
themselves
have
argued
that
the
Gestapo
obtained
valuable
intelligence
also
from
administration
offices
and
all
other
state
institutions,
as
well
as
through
cooperation
with
the
criminal
police
(Kripo),
the
regional
and
the
local
police.
Secondly,
even
if
we
accept
the
argument
according
to
which
the
Gestapo
was
inefficient
and
relied
on
insufficient
intelligence,
we
have
to
take
into
account
the
perception
of
its
power
by
contemporary
Germans
and
the
deterrent
effect
it
had
on
opponents
of
the
regime.
Therefore,
the
lack
of
serious
internal
threats
to
the
regime
can
be
explained
by
the
fact
that
contemporary
dissenters
were
largely
convinced
of
the
omnipotence
of
the
secret
police,
as
is
witnessed
by
the
reports
of
German
Social
Democrats
living
in
the
Third
Reich.
Their
conviction
was
partly
due
to
Nazi
propaganda,
which
praised
the
efficiency
of
the
Gestapo
in
the
mass
media,
but
also
to
the
sheer
observation
that
most
Germans
did
not
oppose
the
regime
and
to
the
fear
that
many
of
them
were
always
ready
to
cooperate
with
the
Gestapo
by
making
denunciations.
In
this
sense,
the
fear
of
denunciations
was
an
important
deterrent
also
against
political
opposition,
even
if
in
reality
their
role
in
this
respect
was
minimal.
The
fear
of
denunciations
was
therefore
an
important
stabilizing
factor
for
the
regime.
It
was
part
of
the
coercive
system
which,
in
conjunction
with
the
widespread
consensus
achieved
among
the
masses
in
the
1930s,
guaranteed
a
large
basis
of
support
for
the
Nazi
state.
The
widespread
support
for
the
regime
and
the
lack
of
active
opposition
contribute
to
explain
why
the
Gestapo
was
so
successful
in
controlling
German
society
until
1945,
despite
its
structural
weakness
and
the
shortage
of
personnel
in
its
regional
and
local
offices.
According
to
Eric
Johnson,
the
Gestapo
“could
afford
to
be
lenient
and
less
than
vigilant
with
most
ordinary
Germans,
for
they
did
not
need
to
be
watched”.
Robert
Gellately
claims
that
“terror
was
not
necessary
to
end
all
non-Nazi
organizational
life
in
the
country,
nor
was
it
used
to
force
the
majority
or
even
significant
minorities
into
line”.
As
Gellately
argues,
Gestapo
terror
was
selective
and
affected
primarily
social
figures
which
most
contemporary
Germans
loathed,
such
as
Communists,
Socialists,
criminals
and
asocials.
In
fact,
many
Germans
favoured
the
Nazi
crackdown
on
these
social
elements
and
their
imprisonment
in
concentration
camps;
they
believed
that
the
Gestapo
would
not
harass
good
‘national
comrades’
(Volksgenossen).
However,
the
arguments
illustrated
so
far
must
not
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
the
Gestapo
was
a
passive
institution
that
relied
on
the
consensus
created
by
the
regime
and
merely
reacted
to
the
denunciations
of
the
civilian
population.
The
Gestapo
was
a
reactive
organ
only
in
cases
of
minor
importance.
It
relied
mainly
on
denunciations
only
for
its
operations
against
Germans
who
had
committed
isolated
crimes.
In
cases
of
major
importance,
such
as
those
involving
Communist,
Socialist
and
clerical
resistance,
the
Gestapo
was
proactive
and
relied
almost
exclusively
on
its
own
agents
and
initiative.
Johnson’s
study
of
Gestapo
archives
in
Cologne
and
Krefeld
has
showed
that
only
a
tiny
fraction
of
cases
involving
Communists,
Socialists
and
religious
sects
were
set
off
by
denunciations.
The
large
majority
of
these
cases
was
initiated
by
the
Gestapo’s
surveillance
network
and
by
confessions
extracted
during
interrogations.
Even
the
majority
of
cases
involving
Jews,
who
were
the
social
group
most
affected
by
voluntary
denunciations,
did
not
come
to
the
Gestapo
through
denunciations.
In
Krefeld,
for
instance,
only
24 %
of
cases
against
Jews
began
with
denunciations
made
by
civilians.
Finally,
during
the
war
years
the
Gestapo
intensified
its
activities
and
the
role
played
by
denunciations
became
more
and
more
limited.
The
activities
of
the
police
to
eliminate
real
and
potential
opponents
took
precedence
over
court
sentences
and
citizens’
rights.
People
who
had
been
acquitted
before
a
court
were
arrested
and
deported
to
concentration
camps
only
for
being
suspects
and
often
with
no
reason
at
all.
The
Gestapo
made
large
use
of
‘protective’
and
‘pre-emptive’
detention.
When
the
home
front
also
became
the
battlefront
(from
the
fall
of
1944
until
May
1945),
any
sign
of
dissent
and
unwillingness
to
continue
to
fight
was
met
with
brutal
repression.
Therefore,
describing
Nazi
Germany
as a
‘self-policing
society’
would
be
an
oversimplification.
Undeniably,
denunciations
were
numerous,
provided
useful
information
to
the
Gestapo
and
“helped
it
to
keep
ordinary
Germans
in
line”.
However,
the
security
police
relied
on
denunciations
only
for
trivial
cases.
For
the
cases
that
constituted
the
most
serious
threats
to
the
Nazi
Volksgemeinschaft
the
Gestapo
had
to
rely
on
its
own
network
of
surveillance,
on
paid
agents
and
on
the
confessions
extracted,
often
under
torture,
from
prisoners
and
suspects.
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Richard
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Life
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the
Third
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1987
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Robert,
The
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1990
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