N. 38 - Febbraio 2011
(LXIX)
projecting economic power
THE China factor
di Marco Siddi
During
the
past
three
decades
China
has
experienced
fast
and
steady
economic
growth
based
on
capital
accumulation,
increase
in
employment,
high
levels
of
investment
and
a
considerable
shift
of
resources
from
agriculture
into
industry
and
the
tertiary
sector.
According
to
economists
David
Miles
and
Andrew
Scott,
China
has
embarked
on
the
same
growth
pattern
as
some
Southeast
Asian
nations
thirty
years
ago,
notably
South
Korea,
Taiwan,
Hong
Kong
and
Singapore.
The
growth
of
these
nations
has
not
substantially
affected
the
world's
economy,
as
they
remained
relatively
small
economies
due
to
the
size
of
their
population
and
markets.
The
same
cannot
be
said
of
China,
with
its
enormous
population
of
1.3
billion:
its
economic
growth
has
had
and
will
have
a
deep
impact
on
the
world
economy
and
on
the
geopolitical
balance.
In
2008
China's
gross
domestic
product
(GDP)
in
purchasing
power
parity
terms
was
$
7,992
trillion;
only
US
GDP
($
14,440
trillion)
and
the
aggregate
GDP
of
the
European
Union's
member
states
($
14,940
trillion)
were
larger.
Despite
the
recent
economic
and
financial
crisis,
China's
GDP
growth
has
remained
large
and
positive,
moving
from
11.4%
in
2007,
to
9%
in
2008
and
an
estimated
8%
in
2009.
In
2009
economic
growth
was
faster
in
industry
(7.5%)
and
the
tertiary
sector
(8.8%).
China
is
the
state
with
the
largest
positive
current
account
balance
($
426.1
billion
in
2008)
and
the
largest
reserves
of
foreign
currencies
and
gold
($
1.955
trillion).
The
huge
money
inflow
generated
by
foreign
direct
investment,
which
rose
to
nearly
$ 84
billion
in
2007,
has
contributed
to
the
quick
growth
of
the
Chinese
economy.
The
existence
of a
large
and
cheap
labour
reserve,
a
vast
consumer
market
and
the
absence
of
independent
trade
unions
have
attracted
numerous
international
companies.
The
latter
no
longer
transfer
only
their
production
units,
but
also
their
research
and
development
departments,
which
results
in
an
increasing
technology
spillover
to
China.
China's
economic
growth
entails
numerous
problems
of
various
nature.
The
environmental
impact
has
been
enormous
and
constitutes
one
of
the
major
future
challenges
for
the
Chinese
leaders.
Furthermore,
China's
export
surplus
has
already
created
several
commercial
conflicts
with
other
states,
in
particular
with
developed
western
economies,
which
may
result
in
new
forms
of
protectionism
in
the
near
future.
Most
importantly,
the
Chinese
economy
is
heavily
reliant
on
overseas
energy
resources.
Beijing
is
currently
the
second
world's
importer
of
oil.
In
order
to
attain
energy
security,
China
has
taken
several
military
measures
to
control
transport
routes
in
the
Indian
Ocean
and
in
the
Western
Pacific,
and
is
likely
to
increase
its
military
presence
in
the
area
in
the
next
decades.
This
has
inevitably
led
to
increasing
tensions
with
other
regional
powers,
such
as
India
and
Japan,
and
with
the
United
States
and
its
allies
in
South-East
Asia.
The
presence
of
frozen
conflicts
in
the
area,
such
as
those
concerning
Taiwan,
the
Spratly
and
Senkaku
Islands,
and
the
expectation
that
China
will
attempt
to
acquire
a
geostrategic
role
commensurate
to
its
economic
weight
further
complicate
the
political
scenario.
Strategic
policy
and
frozen
conflicts
In
order
to
consolidate
its
economic
and
strategic
position
in
East
Asia,
China
will
have
to
undertake
two
essential
steps.
Firstly,
China
will
have
to
assert
its
control
over
the
maritime
area
in
the
South
and
East
China
Sea
which
it
considers
as
its
own
Exclusive
Economic
Zone
(EEZ).
Achieving
control
over
this
area
will
not
be
easy,
as
it
would
affect
the
interests
of
most
of
China's
regional
neighbours
and
would
require
tackling
the
complex
Taiwan
question.
Secondly,
once
China
will
have
solved
the
issues
concerning
its
EEZ,
it
will
have
to
secure
its
energy
transport
routes
in
the
Indian
Ocean
and
southern
Asia.
Achieving
dominance
over
the
South
China
Sea
would
be
important
for
the
exploitation
of
its
economic
resources
(mainly
fishing,
oil
and
gas)
and,
above
all,
because
it
would
guarantee
access
to
the
high
seas
for
the
Chinese
fleet.
China
has
already
taken
military
action
in
the
past
in
order
to
attain
this
objective.
In
1974,
following
the
defeat
of
South
Vietnam,
China
occupied
the
Paracel
Islands;
in
1988,
it
conquered
the
Fiery
Cross
Reef,
not
far
from
the
Spratly
Archipelago.
Sovereignty
over
the
latter
is
claimed
by
China,
Taiwan,
Malaysia,
the
Philippines,
Vietnam
and
Brunei.
In
the
East
China
Sea,
Beijing
has
claimed
sovereignty
over
the
Senkaku
Islands,
an
archipelago
controlled
by
Japan
and
located
west
of
Okinawa
and
north-east
of
Taiwan.
In
January
2008,
the
Taiwanese
government
lamented
an
increasing
number
of
operations
of
the
Chinese
fleet
in
the
Bashi
Corridor,
between
Taiwan
and
the
Philippines.
Taipei's
worries
are
substantiated
by
Beijing's
desire
to
recover
sovereignty
over
Taiwan
itself
in
the
near
future.
Control
over
the
Bashi
Corridor
would
grant
China
access
to
the
high
seas
and
would
enable
its
fleet
to
challenge
US
control
over
the
western
Pacific,
which
is
currently
patrolled
by
the
Seventh
US
fleet
based
in
Guam.
After
securing
its
position
in
the
China
Sea,
Beijing
could
move
to
its
next
fundamental
strategic
objective,
namely
securing
its
energy
transport
routes
from
Africa
and
the
Middle
East.
The
Malacca
Strait
is
the
main
bottleneck
in
this
transport
system,
as
80%
of
China's
oil
imports
depend
on
this
route.
Beijing
has
attempted
to
overcome
this
problem
by
diversifying
its
access
to
the
Indian
Ocean,
for
instance
by
preparing
plans
for
the
construction
of
an
oil
pipeline
between
the
Chinese
city
of
Kunming
and
the
Burmese
port
of
Sittwe,
as
well
as a
railway
linking
the
cities
of
Chanthaburi
in
Thailand
and
Dawei
in
Burma.
China
is
also
contributing
to
the
development
of
offshore
fields
of
liquid
natural
gas
in
South-East
Asia
and
to a
project
concerning
the
construction
of a
navigable
canal
in
the
Kra
Isthmus.
Furthermore,
Beijing
has
started
the
construction
of
permanent
bases
along
its
transport
routes
in
the
Indian
Ocean,
notably
in
the
Cocos
Islands
in
Burma,
Chittagong
in
Bangladesh,
Marao
in
the
Maldives
and
Gwadar
in
Pakistan.
The
future
construction
of
another
base
on
the
East
African
coast,
which
is
becoming
more
and
more
open
to
Chinese
investments,
is
only
a
matter
of
time.
However,
the
strategy
of
building
bases
along
the
coast
of
the
Indian
Ocean
has
alienated
India,
the
major
regional
power
in
the
area.
Increasing
Chinese
presence
in
the
Indian
Ocean
and
Chinese
sales
of
weapons
to
Pakistan
have
led
the
Indian
government
to
launch
a
rearmament
programme
including
the
construction
and
purchase
of
three
aircraft
carriers.
Furthermore,
the
construction
of
bases
alone
will
not
suffice
to
secure
energy
transport
routes
in
case
of
conflict.
In
order
to
achieve
this
objective,
China
must
build
a
high
seas
fleet
with
modern
submarines
and
aircraft
carriers.
Several
steps
have
already
been
taken
in
this
respect.
For
instance,
modern
frigates
have
been
developed
since
2006
and
a
large
underground
submarine
base
was
built
on
the
Hainan
island.
However,
the
key
factor
in
terms
of
sea
power
is
the
development
of
an
aircraft
carrier
programme.
China
needs
at
least
three
aircraft
carriers
to
escort
the
convoys
of
its
oil
tankers
and
freighters
between
its
own
coast
and
the
African
coast.
In
1998
China
bought
the
Soviet
aircraft
carrier
Varyag
from
Ukraine.
According
to
the
US
Office
of
Naval
Intelligence,
the
Varyag
will
be
ready
for
a
training
programme
by
2012
and
will
become
fully
operational
around
2015.
In
addition,
China
would
need
adequate
support
ships
equipped
with
air
defence
systems,
cruisers
and
submarines
capable
of
long-range
operations.
These
modern
armaments
will
be
indispensable
in
order
to
fully
achieve
great
power
status,
which,
according
to
Russel
Ong,
is
the
ultimate
goal
for
Chinese
security
planners
in
the
twenty-first
century.
The
drive
to
great
power
status:
peaceful
coexistence
or
“China
Threat
Theory”?
Russel
Ong
claims
that
China's
current
military
expansion
has
little
to
do
with
any
current
military
threats,
but
stems
from
'a
century
of
humiliation'
by
the
Western
powers
and
the
desire
to
become
a
great
power
in
world
politics.
China's
independence
was
violated
in
the
past
and
Beijing
is
determined
to
ensure
that
this
will
never
happen
again.
According
to
official
Chinese
statements,
China's
foreign
policy
is
based
on
peace,
independence
and
the
principle
of
peaceful
coexistence.
China
is
committed
to a
multipolar
world
and
actively
participates
in
world
and
regional
international
organizations,
including
the
United
Nations
Organization
(where
China
is a
permanent
member
of
the
Security
Council),
the
World
Trade
Organization,
the
Shanghai
Cooperation
Organization
(SCO)
and
the
Council
for
Security
and
Cooperation
in
the
Asia
Pacific
(CSCAP).
In
addition,
China
has
ratified
the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty,
the
Comprehensive
Test-Ban
Treaty
(CTBT)
and
numerous
other
treaties
concerning
arms
control.
Chinese
leaders
state
that
they
will
not
seek
world
hegemony.
However,
some
Western
observers
speculate
that
China
is
merely
buying
time
to
consolidate
its
economic
base
and
will
soon
attempt
to
turn
the
Asian
continent
into
a
Chinese
sphere
of
influence.
As
Paul
Kennedy
argues,
since
military
power
stems
from
economic
power,
economic
growth
will
enhance
China
military
power
projection
in
the
region.
The
People's
Republic
of
China
used
military
force
in
major
confrontations
in
the
past
(for
instance
during
the
Korean
War,
the
border
war
against
the
Soviet
Union
in
1969
and
the
war
against
Vietnam
in
1979)
and
will
continue
to
do
so
in
the
future.
This
realist
analysis
of
Chinese
foreign
policy
gave
rise
to
the
“China
Threat
Theory”.
Chinese
leaders
claim
that
the
“China
Threat
Theory”
is
an
unintended
consequence
of
China's
search
for
comprehensive
security.
Some
Chinese
analysts
believe
that
there
is a
foreign
attempt
to
line
up
the
West
to
fight
an
imaginary
enemy
and
that
after
the
collapse
of
the
Soviet
Union
China
has
taken
up
the
role
of
the
West's
main
imaginary
enemy.
Samuel
Huntington's
theory
of
the
“clash
of
civilizations”,
which
predicts
a
neo-Confucianism
ideological
challenge
to
the
West,
is a
manifestation
of
this
attempt.
China's
statements
in
support
of
the
principle
of
peaceful
coexistence
are
sincere.
However,
it
is
debatable
whether
this
is a
long-term
policy
or
if
it
is
rather
a
strategy
to
build
up
economic
and
military
power.
On
the
one
hand,
Beijing
considers
the
United
States
as
its
most
important
strategic
and
economic
partner.
On
the
other
hand,
however,
it
believes
that
Washington
is
planning
to
contain,
encircle
and
isolate
China.
According
to
Russel
Ong,
China
wants
to
emulate
Japan's
rise
in
Asia.
The
end
of
the
Cold
War
has
provided
a
relatively
peaceful
environment
for
China
to
reformulate
its
military
strategy
and
modernize
its
weapons.
For
instance,
in
1999
China
successfully
tested
the
road-mobile
intercontinental
ballistic
missile
(ICBM)
Dongfeng-31,
which
gives
Beijing
a
major
strike
capability
immune
from
a
pre-emptive
takeout
and
threatens
US
forces
both
in
the
Pacific
theatre
and
in
North
America.
Western
analysts
speculate
that
China
is
currently
developing
another
generation
of
ICBMs,
known
as
Dongfeng-41,
with
an
even
greater
range
and
capable
of
delivering
up
to
ten
independently
targeted
warheads.
According
to
Richard
Fisher,
China
is
most
likely
developing
an
anti-ballistic
missile
system
which
could
be
deployed
after
2020.
Furthermore,
programs
for
the
construction
of
fifth-generation
combat
jets,
large
amphibious
assault
ships
and
large
airlifters
are
under
way.
China's
nuclear
and
conventional
rearmament
and
the
prospect
of
US
political
retrenchment
from
South-East
Asia
has
aroused
fear
among
US
allies
in
East
Asia
and
has
led
to
an
arms
build-up
in
the
region.
However,
China
has
also
ratified
the
NPT
and
the
CTBT
and
declares
that
its
nuclear
weapons
are
solely
for
self-defence.
After
the
US
military
interventions
in
the
Kosovo
crisis
(1999),
Afghanistan
(2001)
and
Iraq
(2003),
Chinese
diplomacy
multiplied
its
efforts
to
establish
new
political
alliances
and
counter
growing
US
activism
in
Eurasia.
In
2001
the
Shanghai
Cooperation
Organization
(SCO)
was
founded
by
the
leaders
of
China,
Russia,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan
and
Uzbekistan;
India,
Iran,
Mongolia
and
Pakistan
were
granted
the
status
of
observers.
The
objectives
of
the
organization
include
security,
economic
and
cultural
cooperation,
fighting
terrorism
and
securing
energy
supplies.
However,
Western
analysts
such
as
Richard
Fisher
believe
that
the
main
aim
of
the
SCO
is
excluding
the
United
States
from
Central
Asia
and
making
the
region
'safe
for
authoritarian
government'.
The
SCO
Charter
declares
the
members's
opposition
to
terrorism,
separatism
and
extremism.
However,
“extremism”
is
often
interpreted
to
mean
both
Islamic
radicalism
and
democracy.
The
main
accomplishments
of
the
SCO
have
been
in
the
area
of
military
cooperation:
in
2005
the
first
major
military
exercise
between
Russia
and
China
was
held
in
the
Shandong
Peninsula
and
in
August
2007
all
six
SCO
members
took
part
in a
second
military
exercise
in
Russia.
Furthermore,
China
has
been
very
active
in
the
field
of
multilateral
negotiations
concerning
present
conflicts.
Beijing
has
played
a
decisive
role
in
the
6-Party
Talks
regarding
the
North
Korean
nuclear
programme
and
in
recent
negotiations
with
the
Sudanese
government.
China's
role
has
been
strengthened
by
its
soft
power,
notably
its
economic
influence,
which
is
extending
more
and
more
on a
global
level.
Diplomatic
and
economic
contacts
with
Africa
and
Latin
America
have
intensified;
China
imports
raw
materials
and
exports
technology
and
its
surplus
manufactured
products.
In
Congo
the
China
Railway
Engineering
Corporation
and
the
Synohydro
Corporation
are
building
or
repairing
3,000
kilometres
of
roads
and
railways,
thirty-five
hospitals,
145
health
care
centres,
four
universities
and
50,000
houses.
In
exchange,
the
Congolese
government
promised
to
deliver
ten
million
tons
of
copper,
200,000
tons
of
cobalt
and
372
tons
of
gold.
China's
companies
started
to
invest
even
in
Afghanistan,
where
the
China
Metallurgical
Construction
Corporation
bought
the
copper
mine
in
Aynak,
which
is
the
world's
second
largest
copper
mine
and
is
located
in a
province
currently
under
Taliban
control.
Furthermore,
China
committed
itself
to
building
an
electric
power
station,
a
foundry,
a
railway
line
between
Aynak
and
Tajikistan,
houses
and
health
care
centres.
Present
and
future
challenges
Despite
its
impressive
economic
growth,
military
build-up
and
significant
diplomatic
efforts,
in
the
near
future
China
will
have
to
cope
with
several
major
challenges
from
within
and
without.
The
major
challenges
from
within
consist
in
making
the
rapid
economic
growth
environmentally
sustainable
and
finding
an
acceptable
modus
vivendi
with
ethnic
minorities,
in
particular
those
living
in
western
China.
The
major
challenge
from
without
is
represented
by
the
task
of
acquiring
world
power
status
without
undermining
global
peace
and
stability.
The
Tibetans
and
the
Uyghurs,
living
respectively
in
the
autonomous
regions
of
Tibet
and
Xinjiang,
are
the
ethnic
minorities
that
cause
major
concerns
in
Beijing.
Approximately
2.6
million
Tibetans
live
in a
vast
area
of
1,228,400
km²,
which
was
occupied
by
the
Chinese
People's
Liberation
Army
(PLA)
in
1950-1951.
Tibetan
revolts
were
particularly
violent
until
the
1970s
and
have
continued
thereafter,
mostly
under
the
leadership
of
Tibetan
monks,
who
demand
real
autonomy
and
minority
rights
for
Tibet.
China's
response
involved
both
harsh
repression
and
encouraging
the
transfer
of
ethnic
Han
Chinese
to
Tibet,
also
through
the
inauguration
of
the
railway
line
Lhasa-Beijing
in
July
2006.
Although
the
prospect
of
Tibet's
secession
seems
highly
impracticable,
the
Tibetan
question
is
and
will
remain
a
thorny
issue
for
Beijing,
as
was
witnessed
by
the
large
scale
protests
against
the
violation
of
human
rights
in
the
region
during
the
Olympic
games
in
China
in
August
2008.
Violent
ethnic
conflicts
in
the
Xinjiang
region
have
erupted
again
in
July
2009,
resulting
in
197
dead
and
1,684
wounded
according
to
official
data.
45.6%
of
the
local
population
is
made
up
by
Uyghurs,
a
moslem
Turkic
ethnic
group
living
in
Central
and
Eastern
Asia,
40.6%
are
ethnic
Han
Chinese
and
6.7%
are
Kazakhs.
The
Uyghur
population
laments
the
lack
of
minority
rights
and
the
increasing
influence
of
the
Hans.
The
Uyghur
language
has
the
status
of
secondary
language,
while
the
study
of
Chinese
became
compulsory
also
in
primary
schools
in
2003.
Most
Uyghurs
do
not
speak
Chinese,
which
constitutes
a
major
obstacle
to
their
aspirations
to
work
in
companies
led
by
ethnic
Chinese.
Separatist
movements
have
emerged
in
the
areas
inhabited
by
the
Uyghurs,
notably
the
East
Turkestan
Islamic
Movement,
which
is
probably
linked
to
Al-Qaeda.
Moreover,
the
relatively
recent
independence
of
the
former
Turkic
Soviet
Republics
in
Central
Asia,
just
across
the
border
of
the
Xinjiang
region,
has
aroused
expectations
of
emancipation
among
the
Uyghurs
too.
Most
Uyghurs
do
not
demand
independence,
but
only
the
respect
of
their
own
identity
and
more
social
justice.
During
the
next
years,
China
will
have
to
cope
with
these
requests
if
it
wants
to
stabilize
a
region
whose
strategic
importance
has
grown
considerably:
oil
and
natural
gas
imports
from
Russia,
Turkmenistan
and
Kazakhstan
transit
through
the
Xinjiang
before
reaching
the
metropolises
in
eastern
China.
The
environmental
impact
of
China's
economic
and
demographic
growth
constitutes
the
second
major
internal
challenge
which
China
has
to
face
now
and
in
the
years
to
come.
Two
thirds
of
the
huge
Chinese
population
lives
in
eastern
China,
where
natural
resources
have
been
put
under
considerable
stress.
If
Chinese
per
capita
consumption
of
meat
and
cereals
was
to
reach
US
levels,
China
would
demand
67%
of
the
world's
production
of
cereals
and
76%
of
the
world's
meat
production.
Today
China
uses
up
40%
of
the
world's
production
of
coal,
25%
of
the
world's
steel
and
nickel
production
and
19%
of
the
world's
aluminum
production;
furthermore,
it
is
the
second
largest
consumer
of
oil
after
the
United
States.
Pollution
and
water
scarcity
have
become
serious
problems
in
the
urban
areas
of
eastern
China.
60
of
the
main
560
rivers
in
China
have
dried
up
or
are
about
to
do
so.
According
to
the
estimates
of
experts,
the
vital
Chinese
rivers
Huang
He
and
Yangtze
Kiang
will
dry
up
before
reaching
the
sea
in a
few
years.
This
is
the
result
of
both
increased
water
demand
in
the
densely
populated
areas
and
the
melting
of
Himalaya
and
Tibet
glaciers.
Due
to
the
wild
deforestation
along
China's
rivers,
the
risk
of
floods
and
desertification
has
increased
enormously
in
Manchuria
and
in
the
Guizhou
and
Xinjiang
provinces.
The
desert
expands
by
2,500
km²
per
year
and
is
already
threatening
the
large
conurbations
in
north-eastern
China.
Officials
of
the
Chinese
government
have
calculated
that
the
environmental
cost
of
growth
in
2005
amounted
to
10%
of
the
GDP,
which
roughly
corresponds
to
the
annual
growth
rate
of
China.
As a
consequence,
the
government's
concerns
about
the
environment
have
grown.
Prime
Minister
Wen
Jiabao
has
declared
that
China
must
become
an
environment-
and
resource-friendly
society.
China's
production
of
renewable
energies
such
as
solar
and
wind
energy
is
constantly
on
the
rise,
but
greater
efforts
are
needed
to
achieve
the
aim
declared
by
Prime
Minister
Jiabao.
In
addition
to
these
urgent
domestic
issues,
China
will
have
to
deal
with
the
global
implications
of
its
rise
to
great
power
status
and
with
the
challenges
coming
from
abroad.
The
main
ideological
challenge
is
probably
the
one
posed
by
democracy
and
human
rights,
which
question
the
legitimacy
of
the
ruling
Chinese
Communist
Party
(CCP)
and
of
its
methods
of
government.
These
values
may
become
widespread
also
in
China
and
undermine
the
power
of
the
approximately
300
members
of
the
Central
Committee
of
the
CCP
who
ultimately
rule
the
country.
However,
excessive
foreign
insistence
on
democratic
values
and
human
rights
may
also
have
the
opposite
effect
of
rallying
the
Chinese
population
behind
its
government.
This
happened,
for
instance,
in
April
and
May
2008,
when
Chinese
at
home
and
abroad
showed
resentful
and
sometimes
threatening
nationalist
anger
in
response
to
Western
protests
against
China's
policy
in
Tibet
and
Sudan.
Furthermore,
the
present
power
position
of
the
CCP
depends
on
the
loyal
support
of
the
2.25
million
members
of
the
PLA,
the
1.5
million
People's
Armed
Police
and
the
800,000
other
internal
security
forces
which
enforce
the
CCP's
political
dictatorship.
Due
to
the
important
role
played
by
the
PLA
in
Chinese
society
and
politics,
there
is a
risk
that
the
army
will
make
pressure
to
tackle
unresolved
disputes
by
using
military
force
abroad
too.
The
Taiwan
issue
might
provide
the
first
occasion
for
the
PLA
to
flex
its
muscles.
Chinese
leaders
often
declare
that
Taiwan
is
an
integral
part
of
China
and
that
reunification
with
Taiwan
is a
“sacred
mission”
for
the
Chinese
people.
In
addition,
Taiwan's
east
coast
offers
immediate
access
to
deep-water
patrol
areas
for
nuclear
ballistic
submarines.
Missiles
and
bombers
stationed
in
Taiwan
would
be
much
closer
to
US
forces
in
Guam
and
much
better
placed
to
monitor
and
interdict
Japanese
and
US
forces
based
in
Japan.
Until
now,
the
PLA
and
the
CCP
have
been
deterred
from
undertaking
military
action
against
Taiwan
by
the
high
costs
that
such
an
operation
would
entail,
notably
the
high
possibility
of
war
with
the
United
States
and
the
subsequent
loss
of
an
essential
economic
partner.
Meanwhile,
however,
China's
military
strength
in
the
Taiwan
Strait
is
growing.
Simultaneously,
China
is
pursuing
a
multifaceted
strategy
combining
political,
economic,
cultural
and
psychological
elements
to
prevent
Taiwan
from
declaring
de
jure
independence
and
then
maneuver
Taipei
into
accepting
unification
with
China
in
the
long
run.
Beijing
has
encouraged
Taiwanese
investment
in
China
and
tolerated
a
large
Taiwanese
trade
surplus
to
build
supporters
in
Taiwan's
business
community.
It
has
tried
to
split
Taiwan's
politicians
by
appealing
to
the
Kuomintang
Party
and
refusing
to
talk
to
the
Democratic
Progressive
Party.
Moreover,
it
has
promised
that
Taiwan's
economic,
social
and
military
system
will
not
change
after
reunification.
These
promises
referred
to
the
event
of a
peaceful
reunification.
According
to
Richard
Fisher,
if
reunification
was
to
be
achieved
forcefully,
a
harsh
occupation
featuring
massive
political
purges,
refugee
flows
and
comprehensive
national
reeducation
campaigns
would
take
place
and
Taiwan
would
be
turned
into
a
base
for
PLA
forces.
The
Taiwan
issue
is
not
the
only
source
of
friction
with
the
United
States.
China's
dubious
role
in
the
nuclear
proliferation
of
Iran,
North
Korea
and
Pakistan
contributed
to
sour
relations
with
Washington.
The
PLA
has
given
consistent
and
strong
support
to
North
Korea,
which
serves
to
create
a
proxy
threat
against
Japan
and
to
keep
Koreans
divided.
In
the
1990s
China
provided
engineering
training
and
material
to
help
Pyongyang
develop
the
Taepodong
intermediate-range
ballistic
missile.
In
addition,
Beijing
consistently
opposed
US
efforts
to
impose
UN
sanctions
on
North
Korea,
which
repeatedly
banned
international
inspectors
from
its
nuclear
facilities,
thereby
acting
in
contravention
to
the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty
(NPT).
China's
actions
in
the
Six-Party
Talks
after
2004
have
not
produced
any
significant
results
and
could
be
seen
as
an
attempt
to
give
North
Korea
vital
time
to
build
up
its
nuclear
arsenal.
Furthermore,
China
helped
Pakistan
to
develop
nuclear
capability,
which
both
created
a
nuclear
proxy
against
a
common
enemy,
India,
and
gave
Beijing
great
prestige
in
the
larger
Sunni
world.
China
has
also
been
indispensable
to
Iran's
nuclear
ambitions.
In
2006
China
prevented
strong
action
in
the
UN
Security
Council
against
Iran's
violation
of
the
NPT.
Meanwhile,
China
has
become
Iran's
largest
trading
partner
and
receives
an
increasing
amount
of
Iran's
petroleum
resources.
Beijing's
support
of
and
sales
of
weapons
to
Iran
is
having
wider
implications
in
the
Middle
East,
as
Teheran
is
providing
Chinese-made
weapons
to
Syria
and
Hezbollah
fighters
in
Lebanon.
According
to
Richard
Fisher,
China
is
building
an
Iran-Syria-Hezbollah
axis
to
surround
Israel
and
undermine
US
influence
in
the
Middle
East.
Fisher
claims
that
China's
proliferation
actions
have
made
the
highest
contribution
to
the
possibility
that
terrorists
will
possess
and
use
nuclear
weapons
in
the
future.
Furthermore,
China
is
selling
weapons
and
developing
economic
ties
with
US
rivals,
notably
Sudan
and
Hugo
Chavez's
Venezuela.
Beijing
has
attempted
to
undermine
US
influence
in
the
Far
East
by
trying
to
drive
wedges
between
local
US
allies
and
by
strongly
opposing
the
American
anti-ballistic
missile
system
in
the
region.
Chinese
pressure
has
undermined
cooperation
between
South
Korea
and
the
United
States
over
missile
defense
and
reinforced
South
Korea's
opposition
to
the
use
of
US
troops
stationed
in
its
territory
in a
future
conflict
over
Taiwan.
As a
consequence
of
the
increasing
economic
and
diplomatic
ties
with
Beijing,
Seoul's
current
military
modernization
appears
aimed
as
much
at
US
ally
Japan
as
at
North
Korea
or
China.
China
is
using
its
increasing
commercial
impact
and
its
ties
to
local
ethnic
Chinese
communities
in
South-East
Asia
too.
China's
approach
has
been
appealing
compared
to
Washington's
preoccupation
with
Islamic
terrorism,
in
particular
in
the
largely
Muslim
states
of
Malaysia
and
Indonesia
and
in
the
Philippines.
Since
the
US
military
departure
from
Philippine
bases
in
1992,
Manila
does
not
seem
as
committed
as
Japan
or
Australia
to
be
active
as a
US
ally.
Furthermore,
Thailand
has
a
long-standing
close
relationship
with
the
PLA
and
in
July
2007
it
held
its
first
joint
military
exercise
with
China.
Australia
is
still
a
reliable
US
ally,
but
its
growing
economic
ties
with
China
make
confrontation
with
Beijing
over
issues
such
as
Taiwan
a
very
unattractive
prospect.
China
has
already
become
Australia's
most
important
market
for
natural
gas,
iron
ore
and
other
commodities.
Thus,
as
professor
Renato
Cruz
De
Castro
has
noted,
'While
the
United
States
remains
Southeast
Asia's
most
important
military
actor,
its
power
and
influence
are
being
gradually
eroded
by
China's
soft-power
diplomacy
and
hard-power
buildup.
According
to
US
Pacific
Commander
Admiral
Timothy
Keating,
in
July
2007
some
Chinese
officials
went
as
far
as
to
propose
the
creation
of a
Chinese
sphere
of
influence
in
the
Western
Pacific,
while
the
US
would
retain
control
over
the
Eastern
Pacific.
US-China
relations
are
further
complicated
by
the
lack
of
military
transparency,
the
frequent
interruptions
in
US-PLA
exchanges
and
occasional
diplomatic
incidents.
American
requests
to
inspect
new
PLA
weaponry
were
rebuffed
until
late
2006.
Little
is
known
about
China's
current
and
especially
future
military
policies
and
weapon
systems,
as
the
Chinese
press
is
not
allowed
to
report
in
depth
about
it.
Furthermore,
the
United
States
are
worried
about
the
current
PLA
preparations
for
cyberwarfare
and
for
space
warfare,
which
could
cripple
the
US
economy
and
eliminate
Washington's
primary
means
of
surveillance
and
communication.
Diplomatic
crises
between
Washington
and
Beijing
continue
to
occur
when
the
US
undertakes
actions
in
areas
which
China
considers
of
vital
interest
for
itself.
For
example,
in
November
2007
China
informed
the
United
States
that
US
aircraft
carrier
Kitty
Hawk
was
not
welcome
in
Hong
Kong,
following
American
military
sales
to
Taiwan
and
the
recent
Washington
DC
reception
of
the
Dalai
Lama,
Tibet's
spiritual
leader.
Finally,
the
rise
of
China's
power
in
East
Asia
has
led
to
tensions
also
with
regional
and
global
actors
that
are
not
US
allies.
Despite
considerable
improvements
in
the
last
decade,
Sino-Vietnamese
relations
are
marred
by
mutual
suspicion
and
the
military
and
diplomatic
conflicts
of
the
1970s
and
1980s.
This
was
demonstrated,
for
instance,
by
Vietnam's
skepticism
when
the
PLA
suggested
joint
military
exercises
with
the
members
of
the
Association
of
Southeast
Asian
Nations
in
2005.
Despite
the
recent
cooperation
within
the
SCO
framework,
also
relations
with
Russia
remain
ambiguous.
Mutual
mistrust
stems
from
historic
rivalries
and,
most
importantly,
clashing
economic
and
security
interests.
Parallel
to
the
SCO,
Russia
founded
the
Collective
Security
Treaty
Organization,
which
includes
SCO
members
such
as
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan
and
Uzbekistan
but
is
tightly
controlled
by
Moscow.
China
and
Russia
compete
over
Central
Asia's
natural
resources,
as
was
witnessed
by
the
recent
controversy
over
the
control
of
Turkmeni
gas.
Furthermore,
Russia
is
preoccupied
by
the
increasing
Chinese
economic
and
demographic
penetration
in
the
underpopulated
areas
of
eastern
Siberia.
Conclusion
Western
and
Chinese
observers
unanimously
state
that
China
will
be a
superpower
in
the
near
future.
Beijing's
current
economic
power,
its
increasing
military
strength
and
active
diplomacy
are
the
main
determinants
of
this
assessment.
However,
China
will
also
have
to
cope
with
major
internal
and
external
challenges,
such
as
unrest
among
its
ethnic
minorities,
the
devastating
environmental
consequences
of
its
economic
and
demographic
expansion
and
tensions
with
other
regional
and
global
powers
resulting
from
China's
increased
economic,
military
and
diplomatic
efforts.
Western
observers
such
as
Robert
Kagan
and
Bill
Gertz
have
formulated
the
“China
Threat
Theory”,
according
to
which
China's
rise
will
not
be
peaceful
and
will
result
in a
Chinese
hegemonic
attempt,
thereby
constituting
a
serious
security
threat
for
the
United
States.
There
is
little
doubt
that
China
wants
to
play
a
key
role
in
Asia
and
increase
its
influence
on a
global
level.
However,
Beijing
has
not
unleashed
any
major
war
during
the
past
three
decades
and
its
estimated
military
expenditure
is
still
less
than
one-sixth
of
total
US
military
budget.
China's
preoccupation
with
acquiring
a
nuclear
deterrent
and
building
up
its
land,
sea
and
air
forces
might
be
justified
by
the
massive
presence
of
US
forces
and
of
other
competing
actors
in
Asia.
Furthermore,
China's
modern
history
contributes
to
explain
its
security
policy:
the
country
experienced
'a
century
of
humiliation'
between
1840
and
1949
and
is
determined
to
ensure
that
this
will
never
happen
again.
List
of
abbreviations:
CCP:
Chinese
Communist
Party
CTBT:
Comprehensive
Test-Ban
Treaty
EEZ:
Exclusive
Economic
Zone
GDP:
Gross
Domestic
Product
ICBM:
Intercontinental
Ballistic
Missile
NPT:
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty
PLA:
People's
Liberation
Army
SCO:
Shanghai
Cooperation
Organization
Printed
sources:
Al-Rhodan,
Khalid,
'A
critique
of
the
China
Threat
Theory:
a
systematic
analysis',
in
Asian
Perspective,
Vol.
31,
No.
3
(2007),
pp.
41-66
